Sweden in NATO: The Collapse of Russia's Foreign Policy
Introduction
Modern Europe faces significant geopolitical changes, and the current question is what will happen to NATO after Sweden joins the alliance. Due to Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine, NATO has fast-tracked Sweden and Finland into the organization despite the opposition of some member countries. Now the question is, how has Sweden’s recent entry into NATO changed the current disposition in Northern Europe, and what response can we expect from Russia?
On March 7, 2024, in WashingtonD.C., the country officially became the 32nd member of the North Atlantic Alliance. During the ceremony, U.S. President Joe Biden, addressing the head of the Swedish government, Ulf Kristersson,said: “Mr. Prime Minister, welcome to NATO, the strongest military alliance the world has ever known.”
What Are the Implications of Sweden’s NATO Membership?
To contextualize thesignificance of Sweden's acceptance into NATO, Sweden's integration into the alliance is a historic step that marks an almost 200-year era of the country’s neutrality. This event led to a concrete strengthening of NATO in the military sphere. While Finland successfully joined the alliance less than a year after the war in Ukraine emerged, Sweden's path to membership faced significant opposition from Turkey and Hungary. Ankara demanded, among other things, that Stockholmindividuals whom the Turkish authorities accuse of terrorism, as well as prevent the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, declared a terrorist organization in Turkey. Budapest, in turn,Stockholm of “denigrating” Hungary and making regular comments regarding the country’s deviation from the norms of the rule of law.After a short period of time, both countries changed their minds, which makes it possible to assume that comments by Erdogan about theissuesare not the actual reason for blocking accession and that.The Turkish and Hungarian leaders wanted to negotiate”as possible, such as negotiating a favorable deal with the United States regarding new F-16 fighter jets.
End of the Era of Neutrality
The entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO is a characteristic expression of the era in which we now live. While Finland hadsince 1949,.Back in the period of theNapoleonic Wars, King Karl XIV Johnsuch a policy after a series of unsuccessful wars.Since then, Stockholm has consistently maintained its status as a neutral state, although it has experienced strong pressure from individual countries.Thus, the Swedes did not formally participate in either World War I or World War II, nor did they join the Warsaw Pact or NATO during the Cold War.However, many countries such as Hitler’s Germany continued to pressure Sweden, forcing it to allow the Nazis.Ironically, this likelyallowed the country to remain neutral, as German military was heavily relying on Swedish iron ore.
In general, the avoidance of large-scale wars and a long tradition of neutrality have made this status part of the national consciousness of the Swedes and the general direction of the country’s security policy. Back in 2014,.However, after Russian troops occupied the Ukrainian peninsula and continued to pursue their aggressive policy in 2014, these indicators changed significantly. After Russia invaded Ukraine, a July 2022Statista pollreported that 64% of Swedes, suggesting that the reason for such an increase was Moscow’s aggressive imperialist policy.
Significantly, Sweden's path to NATO membership began under former Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. It was the,but with the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, they changed theirposition.Ultimately, the country was finally brought into NATO by the liberal-conservative Ulf Kristersson, the current Prime Minister. Thus, it is not difficult to conclude that it was Putin and his imperialist policies that brought Sweden into NATO. Swedes themselves wanted protection and security guarantees in the face of Russia’s efforts to wage the largest war in Europe since the Second World War and forcefully revise the borders of other states.
հ’s Control of the Baltic Sea
With the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, the alliance is experiencing its greatest expansion since the 1990s. Helsinki and Stockholm will collectively add almost300 thousand active and reserve troops to the ranks of the alliance.Sweden itself is a country with a population of 10 million that spendsA significant advantage is that the country’s centuries-old neutrality forced it to develop its military capabilities, reaching a world-class scale. The state now independently.
Additionally, Sweden will strengthen NATO not only with its army and weapons, but also with its favorable territorial location. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic Sea was Moscow's inland sea. The USSR controlled the Baltic states and, under the Warsaw Pact, Poland and East Germany. However, after the collapse of the USSR and Russia's continuation of imperialist policies, everything changed. First, Poland and the Baltic countries' accession to NATO, and now the accession of Finland and Sweden, turned the Baltic Sea into a NATO internal sea. In general, Sweden is a maritime state. The majority of its population lives in the south and is tied to trade with the European Union. The country owns a large number of navy ships in the Baltic Sea—163,.The difference is substantial, and due to the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the difference in forces between NATO and Russia has also increased significantly. The Scandinavian countries, the Baltic countries, and Germany can block the sea borders and straits, and thus, Russia will remain cut off, keeping the Baltic Sea in հ’s control.
Failure of the Kremlin’s Rhetoric
Another question which is crucial to explore is why Sweden's accession to NATO is essential for Ukraine, and how this event contests the basic rhetoric of the Kremlin. Russia has promoted narratives to external audiences about theand used it to justify Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite Putin’s efforts toand use Ukraine’s desire to join NATO to justify Russia’s aggressive policy, the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO completely neutralized this narrative. Due to the integration of Finland into NATO,to 1.584 miles. However, the Kremlin did not oppose the entry of Sweden and Finland, insteadthat these countries posed no direct threat to Russia, while also warning that Russia can take appropriate measures “if necessary.” This statement is ironic as Finland’s accession expanded the borders between Russia and NATO, with the additional future possibility of increasing armed forces on those borders.The narrative about the inadmissibility of NATO expansion would have appealed much better than other motives put forth by Putin. In fact, the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO ultimately wrested this narrative of justification for war against Ukraine from under Putin. Resorting to false narratives about “” andof the Ukrainian people,Russiachose to invade Ukraine and began Europe's most significant war since World War II.
While Russia frequently claims that NATO expansion threatens its security, its actions suggest otherwise. Despite the Kremlin's public threats toward several NATO countries, it has only waged war against non-NATO members like.This suggests that Russia's true motive lies not in defensive concerns over NATO but rather in imperialist ambitions aimed at dominating its neighbors. If NATO truly posed a threat to Russian security, we would expect military aggression toward NATO members. Instead, Russia targets countries that are not under NATO's protective umbrella, reinforcing the idea that its invasions stem from a desire to maintain regional influence, rather than fears of NATO.
About the Author
Daniil Miroshnichenko is a senior at 鶹Ƶ. He is majoring in Political Science in School of Public Affairs and minoring in International Studies in School of International Service with concentrations in Global Security and International Political Economy. Daniil was born in Kyiv and lived his entire life in Ukraine. His studies focus on Authoritarian and Democratization processes, War and Conflict Studies and Transatlantic Security. His main regional focus is Eastern Europe and Eurasia and he is event coordinator at Student Association for Slavic Studies at 鶹Ƶ.